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ABSTRACT

This paper uses informed trading to examine information content of earnings and dividends
announcements. The major innovation of this research design is a combination of assessing
information contents of dividends and earnings announcements based on their surprises and
estimating informed trading to understand market reaction. The premise of this study is that if
announcements contain information it should reflect on traders’ trading patterns. Based on this
premise, I find evidence of significant change in informed trading for dividend announcements
but not for earnings announcements when the announcements are made concurrently, an issue
which the existing literature does not address. I also find significant differences in informed
trading when dividend announcements contain surprises but not when dividends announcements
contain no surprises, which the extent literature provides no empirical evidence. These results
collectively imply that dividends are better signal than earnings to market participants. More
importantly, contrary to recent findings that suggest a decline in information content of
dividends, the results confirm significant information content of dividends. This study highlights
the importance of identification and control of information environment and disaggregating
dividends announcements based on its surprises while studying information content of
announcement.
Keywords: Dividends and Earnings Surprises, Informed Trading.

1. Introduction

This paper introduces a new dimension to extent literature by assessing the information
content of corporate announcements using informed trading. This study considers a market setup where the information environment is not exogenous; rather, it depends on the content of
corporate announcements. Instead of studying the price impact of announcements, this paper
studies the impact of corporate announcements on informed trading. Another key novelty of this
paper is that the research design adequately identifies and controls information environment
while assessing the impact of announcements on informed trading.

The effects of earnings announcements on market microstructure parameters have drawn
interest of many researchers. Early research by Morse and Ushman (1983) find no change in
daily bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements, while Vankatesh and Chiang (1986)
and Patel (1991) report that bid-ask spread changes after the earnings announcements. Using
intraday bid-ask spread and volume, Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) report an increase in
spreads and a decrease in depth a day before the announcement. Krinsky and Lee (1996)
decompose the intraday bid-ask spread surrounding the earnings announcements and report that
information asymmetry increases significantly before and after the earnings announcements. A
more recent study by Chae (2005) reports that abnormal trading volume decrease before the
scheduled announcements.

Similarly earlier work by Venkatash and Chiang (1986) investigates the bid-ask spread
prior to dividend announcements and reports that for certain types of dividend announcements
bid-ask spread increases and for other types of announcements there is no significant change in
bid-ask spread. Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find evidence of excess returns, increased trading volume
and price volatility during the dividend announcements days which suggests increase in
information asymmetry. More recently, Fuller (2003) provides direct evidence of an inverse
relation between the pre-announcements informed trading and announcements day excess
returns.
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The extent literature on the effect of earnings and dividends announcements has several
issues. Most of these papers either use abnormal returns or bid-ask spreads as the metric to
examine the effects of these announcements. It is documented in the asset pricing literature that
there is no unique way to estimate abnormal returns. Hence, it is plausible that the reported
results are highly sensitive to the models used for estimation of abnormal returns. Alternatively
some studies have used bid-ask spreads to examine the announcements effect. Although bid-ask
spreads are easy to compute, but it provide only a snap-shot of market liquidity. There are not
many papers using other measures to evaluate the information content of announcements. So
there is a need for more comprehensive analysis of market reaction to corporate announcements.
This paper contributes to ongoing literature by evaluating the information content of earnings
and dividends announcements using informed trading as a more comprehensive market
microstructure metric.

Moreover, most of these studies have examined the impact of earnings announcements
only when in reality, earnings and dividends announcements are made concurrently. Failure to
control the information environment may completely distort empirical findings. For example, if
we study effect of dividend announcements without controlling the information content of
concurrent earnings announcements then the reported abnormal returns/bid-ask spread may
potentially understate true effect of dividend announcements. So there is a clear need to reevaluate the information content of earnings and dividends announcements using a research
design that explicitly identifies and controls information environment. This paper contributes to
ongoing literature by re-evaluating the information content of earnings and dividends
announcement using a research design that rely on conditional sorting which adequately and
sufficiently identifies and controls information environment.

Another observation is that most of the papers in extent literature examine the
information content of dividend announcements without classifying announcements based on
their surprises. According to dividend signaling hypothesis, only the unexpected changes in
dividend has information content. Hence, failure to address the importance of surprises in
dividends may potentially bias our understanding of true effect of dividend announcements. So
3

this paper contributes to literature by examining the information content of dividend
announcements with proper classification of announcements based on their surprises.

Hence, the research agenda for this paper has two fold. In this paper I address the
question how do concurrent dividends and earnings announcements affect pre-and postannouncements informed trading? This question is mainly motivated by recent empirical
findings and guideline provided by the analytical models. 1 The second question addressed in this
paper is how do surprises in dividends affect pre-and post-announcements informed trading?

The basic premise of studying the changes in informed trading is that if traders can
anticipate the timing of announcements then traders’ will have incentive to acquire information if
they anticipate that the announcement will have significant information content. Once informed
traders acquire information in an anticipation of an announcement, it is likely that informed
traders will avail the information advantage and are more likely to trade prior to announcements.
Subsequently, actual dividends or earnings announcements partially resolve the uncertainty and
prices tend to reflect available information. Eventually informed traders’ information advantage
may not prevail after the announcements hence informed trading is likely to decline. Using same
line of argument, if the traders’ anticipate that corporate announcements will not contain any
significant information content, then acquisition of information is not profitable for them and it
leads to no change in informed trading before and after the announcements.

I conjecture that if dividends are considered as signal then for concurrent dividend
announcements with surprises, informed trading during the pre-announcement period will be
higher than post-announcement period. I also conjecture that if earnings are considered as signal
then for concurrent earnings announcements with surprises, informed trading during the preannouncement period should be higher than that of post-announcement period. To address the
second question, I conjecture that for dividend announcements with surprises, informed trading
during the pre-announcements period will be higher than post-announcements period and for

1

Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) for dividend signaling
models.
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dividend announcements with no surprise, there will be no significant change in informed
trading.
I use the probability of informed trading (PIN)2 as a proxy for informed trading. I
estimate PIN for 28 trading days before and after earnings and dividends announcements. For the
first part of the study, I construct two portfolios. Portfolio one includes firms with the highest
absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in dividends. Portfolio two
constitutes firms with the highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises
in earnings. These portfolios include only the concurrent earnings and dividends announcements.
For the second part of the study, I construct two more portfolios. Portfolio three constitutes firms
with highest surprises in dividends and lowest surprises in earnings. Portfolio four includes
firms that have lowest surprises in dividends and earnings. Portfolio three and four include
dividends and earnings announcements whether made concurrently or separately. The unique
feature of this research design is that identifies and control information environment pertaining
to different corporate announcements.

I find significant difference in PIN for a group of firms that have the highest absolute
surprises in dividends and the lowest absolute surprises in earnings. However, for the group of
firms that contain the highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in
dividends I find no significant change in PIN. Collectively, these results suggest that dividend
announcements contain information beyond that is conveyed by the earnings announcements.

One of the explanations of why earnings announcements do not convey information is
that the management provides “earnings guidelines” periodically and mostly prior to actual
announcements, which help market and analyst update their predictions. Hence, by the time firm
makes earnings announcement, even the surprises in earnings no longer convey significant
information. On the other hand, dividends are viewed as “sticky” and usually management do not
change (increase or decrease) dividends often and do not provide dividends guidelines; as a
result change in dividends conveys significant information about firm’s future earnings
2

The methodology section outlines the estimation issues regarding informed trading and surprises in
dividends and earnings.
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potentials which is also consistent with dividend signaling theories. Hence dividends work as a
better signal than earnings in conveying future earnings potential of the firm.

These findings are consistent with Pettit (1972), Ahrony and Sawary (1980), Asquith and
Mullins (1983). Instead of using abnormal returns, this paper offers new insight by looking at the
changes in informed trading to understand the information content of concurrent dividends and
earnings announcements. One of the major implications of these findings is that they
reemphasize the need for “… adequate identification and control of information conveyed by
earnings announcements…” (Ahrony and Sawary, 1980). Without proper identification and
control of information environment, it could be difficult to infer the information content of
announcements.

Moreover, I find significant differences in informed trading, when dividend
announcements contain surprises. In contrast, when dividend announcements contain no
surprises, there is no significant change in informed trading, implying that for dividend
announcements with no surprises, the information environment does not change significantly.
Collectively, these findings suggest that not all dividend announcements have information
content. A recently study by Amihud and Li (2006) suggest that information content of dividends
is declining, contrary to this, findings presented here suggests that dividend announcements with
surprises have significant information content. It also highlights the need to disaggregate
different dividend announcements based on the surprises in announcements. In most of the cases
firms do not change dividends; failure to classify announcements based on surprises may lead to
distorted results. The results presented here are consistent with dividend signaling theories. Thus
one of the contributions of this study is show the importance of disaggregating dividend
announcements based on their surprises while studying their information content.

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents literature review. Section 3
presents analytical research design and methodology. Section 4 provides empirical research
design. Section 5 discusses empirical results. Finally, section 6 presents the concluding remarks.

6

2. Literature Review
2.1 The effect of earnings announcements on market microstructure parameters:
Ball and Brown (1968) is among the most influential papers that provides compelling
evidence of information content of accounting earnings announcements. They find significant
positive correlation between sign of the abnormal stock return in the month of an earnings
announcement with the sign on the earnings change over that firm’s previous year’s earnings.
They use a) a random walk model and b) a market model in earnings to estimate the earnings
surprises. The association between the announcement period abnormal return and earnings
surprises depend information content of announcements and the earnings expectation models.

Beaver (1968) specify a different earnings expectation model which incorporates the
variability of stock returns and trading volume around earnings announcements. The paper
hypothesize increased the information flow during the earnings announcement period compared
to non-announcement period. He uses return volatility to measure information flow. The
empirical evidence supports his hypothesis. Lee (1992) uses intra-day return and trading volume
and finds a statistically significant price reaction of the same sign as earnings surprises. The
reaction occurs within 30 min of the earnings announcements; he finds no statistically
discernible price effect thereafter. Lee also reports a short lived trading volume reported in less
than two hours for large trades and a few hours for small trades. Landsman and Maydew (1999)
analyze markets reactions to earnings announcements over three decades. They too find that the
stock return volatility and trading volume are significantly greater on earnings announcements
days, but the activity reverts to normal conditions immediately thereafter.
Early research3 by Morse and Ushman (1983) study the change in daily bid-ask spreads
surrounding quarterly earnings announcements and large price changes. They estimate actual and
proportional bid-ask spread (remove the contemporaneous price effects). They report find no
change in daily bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements but also report increase in
bid-ask spread on large absolute price changes.

3

See Kothari (2001) for a discussion of price effects of earnings announcements.
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Vankatesh and Chiang (1986) find significant changes in the spreads after earnings
announcements only in cases when no other material information with regard to firm was
released in the 30-day period prior to the earnings announcements. Patel (1991) report an
increase in bid-ask spreads after earnings announcements, while Skinner (1991) reports similar
results only for announcements that convey large earnings surprises.

Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) study change in liquidity four-day period surrounding
earnings announcements. They estimate intraday bid-ask spreads, depth and volume; report an
increase in spreads and a decrease in depth a day before the announcement and also show
significant increase in spread during and one day after the precise announcement time while
depth return to non-announcements level immediately after the announcement.

Krinsky and Lee (1996) decompose the intraday bid-ask spread surrounding the earnings
announcements and report that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spreads increases
significantly during the announcement window and during the pre-disclosure period.

Chae (2005) studies the change in daily trading volume for scheduled (earnings
announcements) and unscheduled announcements (acquisition, target and bond rating
announcements) reports that cumulative trading volume decrease before the scheduled
announcements. He also reports that abnormal trading volume is also positively correlated with
popular measures of information asymmetry. Finally, the paper reports a positive correlation
between pre-announcements asymmetry of information between post-announcements abnormal
trading volume.

A more recent paper by Cho (2007) uses Foster and Viswanathan (1996) model
(henceforth FV model) and provide both daily and intra-daily estimates of FV model. He reports
that for the intra-daily data, the number of informed traders increases while level of liquidity
trading decreases as the time of earnings announcements approaches. These findings imply that
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as time to announcements approaches increasing number of informed traders trader on their
private information, on the other hand the liquidity trading decreases.

2.2 The effect of dividends announcements on market microstructure parameters:

One of the predictions of dividend signaling models (henceforth DSM) developed in
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) is that unexpected
dividend changes convey information about cash flow; i.e., increase (decrease) in dividend
conveys favorable (unfavorable) information about current and/or future cash flow. Numerous
studies have confirmed that stock prices (within the announcements period) significantly
increase as dividends increase and vice versa. There are two main stream of papers that examine
the empirical validity of dividend signaling hypothesis; the classical papers investigates the price
impact of dividend announcements and the recent set of papers look at announcement effect on
market microstructure parameters mainly on bid-ask spreads.

In a classical research by Pettit (1972) it is reported that a significant price increase
follows dividend increase announcements, and a significant price drop follows dividend decrease
announcements, while earnings announcements have no impact on stock returns. This paper uses
dividend and earnings expectation model to estimate the change in dividend and earnings. This
paper studies the information effect of different level of changes in dividend, dividend omission,
reductions, no change and initial payments.

Aharony and Swary (1980) find a small prices change in response to dividend
announcements after controlling for contemporaneous earnings announcements. To adequately
identify the information content of dividend announcements they examine the dividend and
earnings announcements that are made on different dates (separated by 11 days) within the
quarter. They also employed dividend expectation model to measure the information content of
dividend announcements.
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Asquith and Mullins (1983) study the announcement effect of dividend initiations and
report significant positive excess return. They also report that dividend initiation has larger
impact on price than subsequent dividend changes. For robustness analysis, the study also
estimates announcement period abnormal returns for dividend initiating firms when there are no
other information event, when there are simultaneous earnings announcements and when there
are other events and finds consistent results when no other events occurs with dividend
announcements. However, the results also show lower initial impact of dividend announcements
in the presence other announcements especially earnings announcements.

Other studies examine the empirical validity of dividend signaling hypothesis e.g. Nissim
and Ziv (2001) study the relation between changes in dividend and future profitability of the
firm. In contrary, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) find that changes in dividend do
not convey information about future earnings potentials rather it convey information about
systematic risk of a firm. Overall, a recent review article by Allen and Michealy (2003) reports
mixed empirical evidence in favor of the dividend signaling theory.

The other stream of research studies the effect of dividend announcements on market
microstructure parameters. A pioneer research by Venkatash and Chiang (1986) find a strong
presence of asymmetry of information (measured by the bid-ask spread adjusted for holding
costs) for some types of announcements but not for some other types. They report that the raw
spread increases before second announcements and hardly before first and joint announcements. 4
This result implies that for first and joint announcements there exists only normal asymmetry; on
the other hand since second announcements are non-routine announcements, and hence
asymmetry increases. The study does not focus on the announcements that contain dividend
surprises. It considers all the dividend announcements and observes the impact on spread, which
may give an incomplete result.

4Venkatash

and Chiang (1986) define: i) first announcement as the announcements that are not preceded
by other announcements by at least 30 days, ii) second announcements as the announcements that are
separated from the first announcements by at least 10 days but no more than 30 days, and iii) joint
announcements are the announcements that are made on the same day.
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Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find evidence of excess returns, increased trading volume and price
volatility during the announcement days. Based on this finding, they comment that the observed
excess returns during the announcement period are due to an increase in information asymmetry.
This study focuses only on the announcement window and does not compare pre- and postannouncement trading volume or price volatility to see how the information environment
changes due to dividend announcements.

Fuller (2003) provides direct evidence of an inverse relation between pre-announcement
informed trading and announcement period excess returns. The study also provides evidence of a
positive relation between pre-announcement informed trading and unexpected dividends
changes, but it focuses only on the announcement period.

More recently Graham, Koski and Loewenstein (2006) study the impact on information
processing in financial markets for two different types of corporate announcements;
announcements with timing that are surprise and announcements with timing known in advance.
They estimate intra-day volume, bid-ask spread during the announcement day for initial dividend
announcements (unanticipated announcements) and regular dividend announcements (anticipated
announcements). The find increased intra-day spread before the very anticipated announcements
which subsequently reaches to normal level after the announcements, whereas for the
unanticipated announcements the spreads are normal prior to the announcements but it increases
after the announcements. This study also reports the impact of these announcements on volume,
abnormal returns and volatility.

The review clearly reveals that there is need to investigate information content of
dividends and earnings announcements using a metric other than abnormal returns or bid-ask
spreads which will provide deeper understanding of announcements effect. There is also need for
studying the information content of these announcements concurrently and separately. So this
paper addresses the following two research questions: 1) how do concurrent dividend and
earnings announcements affect pre- and post- announcements informed trading? 2) How do
surprises in dividend announcements affect pre- and post- announcements informed trading?
11

3. Analytical Research design and Methodology
3.1 Analytical Framework:
3.1. a. Information content of dividend and earnings announcements:

The asymmetry of information drives demand for information. There are mainly two
sources of informed agents i) insiders, ii) informed traders (e.g. stock analysts, hedge fund
managers, and bankers). A manager may either use dividend or earnings announcements to
convey future profitability of the firm. According to “dividend signaling theories”, a change in
dividend conveys information about firm’s current/future earnings potentials. Since dividend
decision is almost at management’s discretion, a change in dividend should convey less
ambiguous signal than earnings. Moreover, due to the “sticky” nature of dividend, signals
conveyed by changes in dividends contain information beyond that conveyed by earnings
number.

3.1. b. Informed trading around dividend and earnings announcements:

The insiders’ information is revealed in the market through the financial policy choices,
e.g. periodic payout announcements by the firm. On the other spectrum, the informed traders
reveal their information through trading. Since the insiders’ information is revealed periodically,
the informed traders play a significant role in generating and disseminating information through
their informed trading. Thus, between any two payout announcements, the extent to which
information is going to be incorporated into prices depends on the trading behavior of the
informed traders.

The fundamental hypothesis of this research is that the extent of informed trading is
endogenous and, at least in the short run, the extent of informed trading is affected by the in
formativeness of payout announcements. If the informed traders know the timing of upcoming
corporate announcements then they will acquire information if they believe the announcements
12

will have significant surprise. Hence, informed traders will have incentive to trade on their
information prior to announcements which will lead to higher informed trading. At the
announcements, the uncertainty associated with announcements is partially resolved, so the
information advantage by the informed traders may not prevail which may lead to lower
informed trading. Based on the premise, informed trading depends on the information content of
the announcements which leads to following hypothesis:

Hypothesis One:

If earnings announcements are signal, then for concurrent earnings announcements with
surprise, informed trading during the pre-announcement period should be higher than postannouncement period

Hypothesis Two:
If dividend announcements are signal, then for concurrent dividend announcements with
surprise, informed trading during the pre-announcement period should be higher than postannouncement period.

3.1. c. Surprises in dividend announcements and informed trading:

If dividend announcements have surprises (i.e. the actual dividends are different than
forecasted dividends), then informed traders will have incentive to acquire information prior to
the announcements and informed trading will be higher during the pre-announcement period and
subsequently it will decline since the traders no longer have the informational advantages.

On the other hand, if dividend announcements do not have any surprise (i.e. the actual
dividends are same as expected dividends), then for the informed traders there are no changes in
the information environment during the pre- and post-announcement periods. Therefore, it can be
anticipated that there will be no change in informed trading. This leads to following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis Three:
If dividend announcements have surprise, then informed trading during the preannouncement period should be higher than post-announcement period.

Hypothesis Four:
If dividend announcements contain no surprise, then there will be no significant change
in informed trading during the pre- and post- announcement periods.

3.2 Methodology:
The paper is based on an event study frame work. This section overviews some of the key
definitions and also outlines their estimation techniques.
3.2. a. Measure of surprises in dividends and earnings:
In order to estimate the surprise in dividends and earnings, it is important to determine
the expected dividends and earnings then compare them with the actual. But the expected
dividends and earnings are unobservable. The majority of empirical studies5 follow the “naïve”
method in determining dividend and earnings changes. The “naïve” method defines the surprises
as follows6:





E D j , q  D j ,q 1

(1)

D j , q  D j, q  D j ,q 1

5

These include Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Yoon and Starks (1995),
Benartzi Michaely Thaler (1997), Grullon Michaely Swaminathan (2002) just to name a few. See BarYosef and Sarig (1992) for a detailed comparison of different method of dividends change.
6

Same definitions can be applied in measuring earnings surprises.
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where, Dj,q is the dividends of firm ‘j’ at quarter ‘q’. The critical assumption of the “naïve
method” is that the expected change in dividends is zero. If current dividends are different from
the previous, then it is regarded as informativeness of dividends.
Despite the popularity, there are criticisms of the “naïve” method.7 Bar-Yosef and Sarig
(1992) present a detailed comparison of different methods to estimate dividend changes and
report that the “naïve” model produces a biased proxy of dividend changes since it fails to
account for an upward trend in dividends. Asquith and Mullins (1983) mention that “... the naïve
model used in previous studies may underestimate the wealth effect of an increase in dividends.”
Dhillon, Raman and Ramirez (2003) provide very strong evidence against the naïve model. In
their study, about 33.97% of the sample is misclassified using the “naïve” approach when
compared against alternative methods of dividend changes.

This study uses a different measure to estimate surprises in dividends and earnings. I use
analyst forecasts8 (I/B/E/S forecast) to compare them with the actual announcements. Hence, the
surprises in dividend and earnings are defined as:
Standardized Dividend Surprises D j , q 

 D j,q  Forecast (D j ,q ) 
ˆ j

(2)

where, D j , q are actual dividends per share of firm ‘j’ during quarter ‘q’, Forecast ( D j , q ) are
analyst forecasts of dividends per share for firm ‘j’ during quarter ‘q’, and ˆ j are the standard
deviations of all forecast errors

 D j,q  Forecast (D j,q )  in

the sample. This definition of

informativeness of dividends allows us to compare the estimated surprises across the firms.

7

Using the past sequences of dividends and timing of dividend changes, investors can construct a better
forecasting model; in that case the expected change in dividends may not be zero as assumed in “naïve”
method.
8

Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995) provided theoretical analysis of using analyst forecast as a
proxy for information.
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A related issue in using the IBES dataset is the choice of forecast files9. Previous studies by
Diether et al. (2002) and Vega (2005) show that the empirical results do not significantly change
by using either the detail or summary forecast files. This paper uses the summary history files to
obtain analyst forecasts.

3.2. b. Measure of Informed Trading (Probability of Informed Trading):

An important part of the analysis is to determine the extent of informed trading during
pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. Informed trading cannot be measured directly, but
there are several ways10 to estimate it. In a series of papers, Easley et al.11 have demonstrated a
way to measure informed trading by looking at abnormal order flow. This measure is known as
probability of informed trading (PIN). The underlying assumption of the PIN model is that
public information is directly incorporated into prices without the need for trading activity,
whereas private information is reflected in excess buying or excess selling pressure (abnormal
order flow). Thus PIN is designed to capture the extent of informed trading by looking at the
frequency of buy and sell orders for a stock in a given day. Any imbalance between the buying
and selling frequency would be interpreted as trades motivated by private information, and hence
PIN would count that into its estimation.

In fact, I/B/E/S data include U.S. detailed history file that contains individual analysts’ current forecasts,
the date they submitted the forecast and the dividends announcement date. The summary history file
contains summary statistics on analysts’ forecasts such as mean, median and standard deviations of all
outstanding forecasts as of the third Thursday of the month. The I/B/E/S summary history file uses
analysts’ forecasts that are not current. This error on the part of I/B/E/S can be corrected using the U.S.
detailed history file.
9

10

According to Huang and Stoll (1996), the adverse selection component of the spread corresponds to the
extent of asymmetry of information, which is often used as a proxy for informed trading. Bessembinder
(1999) proposes a price impact measure as a proxy for informed trading.
11

Detailed discussion on PIN measures is available in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara (1997), Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara and Paperman (1996), and Easley, O’Hara (1987, 1992). Discussion on PPIN measure is available
on Aslan et al. (2007).
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Using this model requires data on the number of buys and sells per day, which is not
directly available from the empirical data. The standard procedure in the literature is to follow
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to determine the number of buys and sells each day from the
intraday data. Very briefly, according to this algorithm methods, trades for which the transaction
price is above the current mid-quote are considered buys and below the mid-quote are sells.
Trades at the midpoint are classified depending upon the price movement of the previous trades
and will be a buy if the midpoint is moved up. If there were no price movement, then one should
move back to the prior price movement and use that as the benchmark and so on.

According to Easley et al. (2002), this model can be estimated using the following log
likelihood function:

L( B, S )  (1   )e

b

B
S
 bB  s  sS
b  b
 (   ss ) (    s )
e
  e
e
B!
S!
B!
S!

(3)
B

  (1   )e (  b )

S
s

(    b )  s 
e
B!
S!

where B and S represent total buy trades and sell trades for the day, respectively, and

  ( ,  ,  ,  b ,  s ) is the parameter vector. Here,  (1   ) denotes the probability of a "good
news day,"  denotes the probability of a "bad news day," and the probability of "no-news
day" is captured by (1   ) . To maximize the likelihood function, I need to assume
independences across the trading days. Thus, the likelihood function across T days can be
obtained by the product of likelihoods for each day as described by the following equation:

T

V  L( M )   L( Bi , Si )
i 1
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(4)

where ( Bi , Si ) is trade data for day i = 1,…,T and M  (( B1S1 ), ( BT ST )) is the data
set. Equation (4) is maximized over θ given the data M, to determine the underlying structural
parameters of the model (i.e.  ,  ,  ,  b ,  s ).

The estimated values of the parameters obtained from equation (4), are then used to
construct the probability that an order is from an informed trader (PIN), which is defined by the
following equation (as in Easley et al. (2002)):
PIN 


   S   B

(5)

where    S   B is the arrival rate for all orders, i.e., from informed and uninformed
traders, and  denotes the arrival rate for information-based orders. So PIN is the ratio of
orders originating from informed traders relative to the overall order flow. It is important to note
that PIN is a combination of three parameters. It is not solely determined by the arrival rate of
informed traders. Analytically, the probability of informed trading will be higher when there are
more frequent information events (captured by  ), and/or higher arrival of informed traders
(captured by  ), and it is lessened by the willingness of uninformed traders to hold the stock
captured by the  ’s.

For ease of computation, it is assumed that  B and  s are the same for a given day, and
the following definition has been used for estimating PIN in this paper:

PIN 


  2

(6)

4. Empirical Research Design
The empirical analysis focuses on two estimation windows: pre-announcement (-42 days,
-2 days) periods and post-announcement (+2 days, +42 days) periods relative to dividend,
earnings and share repurchase announcements dates. It is important to note that 40 calendar days
18

is approximately 28 trading days. All the study-related results refer to 28 trading days for each of
these two windows.

The empirical analysis on dividend and earnings announcements uses the analyst
summary forecast of dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) between 2002 and
2008 obtained from I/B/E/S database. The key variables of interest are the median forecasts of
DPS and EPS and announcement dates of dividends and earnings. The sample constitutes
quarterly dividends and earnings forecast for the U.S. firms only. In addition, sample does not
include firms that initiate or resume dividends. Following these sample selection criteria,
observations are first merged with CRSP then with COMPUSTAT and finally with TAQ
database. The merged dataset contains 5,508 observations (firms/quarters). The merged dataset is
then used to construct several portfolios using two-stage sorting to identify and control
information environment. To test the information content of concurrent dividend or earnings
announcements, I construct two different portfolios. Portfolio one includes the firms (107
observations) that have highest absolute surprise in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in
earnings. Both portfolios only consider concurrent dividends and earnings announcements. For
both portfolios, the absolute surprises are first sort into decile then the top decile is further sorted
into quartiles. The two stage sorting is an innovative research design over the extent literature.
This allows for adequate control of information pertaining to dividend announcements while
studying the information content of earnings announcements and vice-versa. Once the portfolios
are created then trades and quotes data are used to determine the number of buys and sells to
estimate PIN.

I further construct two different portfolios to examine how surprises in dividends affect
pre- and post-announcements informed trading. The surprises in dividends and earnings are
estimated using the actual and analyst forecast of dividends and earnings for the period of 2002
to 2005. While constructing these portfolios, I relax the assumption of concurrent dividend and
earnings announcements. Hence, Portfolio three includes only the firms (107 observations) that
have highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings; on the
other hand Portfolio four contains the firms (107 observations) that have lowest absolute
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surprises in dividends and earnings. Comparing the pre- and post-announcements informed
trading for these portfolios will help understanding whether all dividend announcements have
information content. The Portfolio four contains the firms that rarely change their dividends; in
my sample there are 754 observations. Since the sample size for the bottom quartile is reasonably
large, the study only looks at a representative sample. To draw the representative sample of 107
observations (to make even comparison with the Portfolio three) out of 754, Portfolio four is
further sorted by size of firms and years and within each size-year quartiles firms are selected
randomly [the number of firms to select from each size quartile is proportional to the weight of
each size quartile in the entire sample].

5. Empirical results and analysis
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for Portfolio one. The average absolute surprises
in earnings for the firms in this Portfolio are 11.81 whereas the average absolute surprises in
dividends are zero. Thus, the double sorting method ensures studying the appropriate earnings
announcements. Since the average absolute surprises in dividends is zero, hence any information
reveled by managements pertain to earnings only.
Table 2 reports the differences in probability of informed trading for Portfolio one; it is
evident that for absolute surprises in earnings, the cross-sectional difference in PIN is not
statistically significant. Further, for positive and negative announcements surprises, I also do not
find any change in cross-sectional PIN. In all the three cases, the differences in PIN are positive
which implies that informed trading before the announcements is higher than after the
announcements.

The results also show that on an average the differences in cross-sectional arrival rate of
informed traders and uninformed traders are negative. It is plausible that the uninformed traders
anticipate presence of informed traders prior to announcements that might induce them to trade
after the announcements. On the other hand, the informed traders may find opportunities to trade
after the announcements; it is also plausible that due to superior interpretation skill they take
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advantage of the asymmetry of information that prevails immediately after the announcements.
The management occasionally issue earnings guideline (management forecasts) for the analyst
prior to the actual announcements. The management guidelines often remove uncertainty
associated with actual earnings announcements; as a result, the informed traders may no longer
have the informational advantage, which may lead to lower informed trading prior to the
announcements.

Table 3 provides summary statistics for Portfolio two, that contains the firms with highest
absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The average absolute
surprises in dividends are 7.68 which is lower than that of earnings, but the average surprise in
dividends are 2.28 whereas average surprises in earnings is 0.76. The average market
capitalization for these firms is 19.0 million, which is similar to that of firms in Portfolio one.
The quoted spreads, effective spreads and relative spreads are also similar for both the Portfolios.
Table 4 shows the cross sectional differences in PIN parameters for Portfolio two. There is
significant difference in PIN for the firms that have highest absolute surprises in dividends and
lowest absolute surprises in earnings.

This result implies that for concurrent dividend announcements with surprises, the
informed traders prefer to trade prior to announcements. The difference in informed trading
reflects the information content of dividend announcements. Combining the results presented in
table 2 and 4 it is evident that dividend announcements with surprises convey information above
and beyond what is contained in earnings announcements.

Table 5 presents summary statistics for Portfolio three in Panel A and Portfolio four in Panel
B. Portfolio three contains firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute
surprises in earnings, when dividends and earnings are announced anytime during the estimation
window.

One of the key features of firms in Portfolio three is that the surprises are not

concentrated on any one size-quartile and there is no monotonic relation between the size of the
firm and the surprises in dividends. By construction, the bottom decile firms have zero surprises.
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Further, the average surprises in earnings are very small, and there is no monotonic relation
between the size of the firm and surprises in earnings.

The estimates in Table 6 explain that there is a statistically significant difference in crosssectional informed trading for the firms in Portfolio three. This result implies that dividend
announcements with surprises have information content after controlling for the information
content in earnings announcements regardless whether the announcements are made concurrently
or separately.

It is apparent that during the post-announcement period, ‘alpha (α)’ decreases while
‘delta (δ)’ increases marginally and ‘epsilon (ε)’ increases but ‘mu (µ)’ decreases. This means
that the post-announcement periods can be characterized by the higher cross-sectional arrival of
uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’) and lower cross-sectional arrival of informed
traders (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) on average.

The differences in arrival rates are one of the key factors that contribute to lower
informed trading during post-announcement periods. This result is consistent with the
classical market microstructure theory that suggests a reduction in the degree of
information asymmetry after public announcements (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle
(1985)). The essence of this result is that when the timing of information events is fairly
predicted, it is more likely that uninformed traders will lose to informed traders (i.e.,
adverse selection problems get worse) if they trade before the announcements. 12 For that
reason, uninformed traders’ hold back and trade after the announcements. On the other
hand, informed traders’ have less informational advantage during the post-announcement
period, since they already traded based on their superior information prior to the
announcements.

12

In a similar study, Cho (2007) reports that as the timing of the earnings announcements approaches, the
number of informed traders increases and liquidity trading decreases.
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In short, the result from Table 6 indicates that surprises in dividends have an impact on
the extent of informed trading during the pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. By
construction, for this sample, the timing of announcements is fairly accurately predicted but
the contents are not, and that contributes towards the increased asymmetry of information
and hence increased informed trading prior to announcements. Once the announcements are
made, there is no incremental benefit from the superior information of informed traders;
hence informed trading decreases.

Table 7 reveals that, on average, PIN for small firms is larger than that for large firms.
This happens because the asymmetry of information for smaller firms is higher than the larger
firms, which suggests higher private information-based trading for smaller firms. This negative
relation between PIN and size is also reported in Easley et al. (2002).
Several cross-sectional features can be observed by comparing quartile one (smaller
firms) and quartile four (larger firms). First, there exists a significant difference in the crosssectional arrival of information (captured by ‘alpha (α)’) during the pre- and post-announcement
periods for these portfolios. This is expected, since on a given day it is more likely to obtain
information for large firms than for small firms. Second, cross-sectionally there exists a
significant difference in the arrival of informed traders (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) during the preand post-announcement periods for these portfolios. Moreover, the cross sectional arrival rate of
informed traders for these portfolios is higher during the pre-announcement period than postannouncement period, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Thirdly, there is a significant
difference in the cross-sectional arrival rate of uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’)
during the pre- and post-announcement periods. Unlike the smaller firms, the arrival of
uninformed traders during the post- announcement period is higher than the pre-announcement
period for the larger firms, which is also consistent with our hypothesis. Finally, the effect of
surprises in dividends on informed trading (PIN) is also visible across the size distributions.

From Table 8, it is apparent that there exists no significant difference in PIN for firms
with zero surprises in dividends. This result implies that there is no significant change in the
23

information environment during the pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. It is also
consistent with the dividend signaling theories. If there are no surprises in dividends, then there
is no new information conveyed, and hence there are no significant changes in informed trading
during pre- and post-announcement periods. It appears that the cross-sectional arrival rate of
informed (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) and uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’) are higher
during the pre-announcement period, unlike the case when dividends contain surprises. When
dividends carry no new information (i.e. no surprises), liquidity traders on average prefer to trade
during the pre-announcement period rather than the post-announcement period. The essence of
this result is that the liquidity traders face less risk of losing to informed traders when dividends
contain no surprises.

The findings presented in Tables 6 and 8 suggest that the decline in information
asymmetry depends on the information contents of announcements. If announcements have
surprises, then the asymmetry of information during the post-announcement period declines. If
announcements do not have surprises, then there is no significant change in information
asymmetry during pre- and post-announcement periods.

Table 9 presents the distribution of parameters estimates from the log likelihood function
sorted into quartiles based on firm size. A detailed comparison of pre- and post-announcement
periods PINs across quartiles sorted by firm size reveals that PIN, on an average, declines
moving from smaller to larger firms.
This is again consistent with the existing findings in the literature. Similar to the top
decile firms, several key features emerge from Table 9. As the firm size increases, the crosssectional arrival rate of informed (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) and uninformed traders (captured by
‘epsilon (ε)’) increases. Cross-sectionally, the uninformed traders prefer to trade more during the
pre- announcements in larger firms compared to smaller firms. This is consistent, since for larger
firms, in case of no surprises in dividends, there is less risk of potential loss from trading against
the informed traders. Finally, even in the case of no dividend surprises, cross-sectionally
informed traders prefer to trade pre-announcements regardless of the size of the firm.
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6. Conclusion
This paper introduces a new dimension to extent literature by assessing the information
content of corporate announcements using informed trading. This research considers a market
set- up where the information environment is not exogenous; rather, it depends on the content of
corporate announcements. Instead of studying the price impact of announcements, this paper
studies the impact of corporate announcements on informed trading.

The study tests the hypothesis that informed trading depends on the information content
of corporate announcements. If an announcement has surprise then pre-announcements informed
trading will be higher than post –announcements, whereas for announcements with no surprises
there will be no change in informed trading. I test these hypotheses by constructing several
portfolios of dividends and earnings announcements. The unique feature of this research design
is that it adequately identifies and controls the information environment pertaining to dividends,
and earnings announcements. It also studies the information content of dividend and earnings
announcements when they are made concurrently and separately. Empirical results confirm that
for earnings announcements with surprises, there are no significant differences in cross-sectional
informed trading after controlling for concurrent dividends announcements, on the other hand for
dividend announcements with surprises, I find a significant change in cross-sectional informed
trading before and after the announcements after controlling for concurrent earnings
announcements. I relax the assumption concurrent announcements and find that dividend
announcements with surprises have significant change in informed trading after controlling for
earnings surprises, whereas for dividend announcements with no surprises, I find no significant
change in informed trading after controlling for earnings surprises.

Collectively, these results suggest that dividend announcements contain information
beyond that is conveyed by the earnings announcements. This is consistent with the finding by
Pettit (1972), Ahrony and Sawary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983) It is widely viewed that
earnings are “variable”; moreover, management provides “earnings guidelines” periodically
which help market and analyst update their predictions. Hence, by the time firm makes earnings
announcement, surprises in earnings no longer convey significant information. On the other
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hand, dividends are viewed as “sticky” and usually management do not change (increase or
decrease) dividends often; as a result change in dividends conveys significant information about
firm’s future earnings potentials which is also consistent with dividend signaling theories. Hence
it is dividends not earnings that convey a signal to the market. Another implication of this result
is that not all dividends announcements have information content. A recently study by Amihud
and Li (2006) suggest that information content of dividends is declining, contrary to this,
findings presented here suggests that dividend announcements with surprises have significant
information content. It also highlights the need to disaggregate the dividend announcements
based on the surprises in announcements, since in most of the cases firms do not change
dividends, failure to study information content of announcements based on surprises may lead to
distorted results.

Future research in this area requires a theoretical model with richer prediction on effect
of corporate announcements on informed trading. The extent literature mostly focuses on the
market microstructure parameters other than informed trading.
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Appendix A
Probability of Informed Trading

According to Easley et al. (2002), there are three major players in this structural model: i)
informed traders, ii) market makers, iii) uninformed traders. The game is repeated over trading
days i=1,…,T. First, nature chooses whether there is new information at the beginning of the
trading day, and these events occur with probability  .

The new information is a signal

regarding the underlying asset value, where good news is that the asset is worth Vi , and bad
news is that it is worth Vi . If an event occurs, then the probability of good news is (1   ) and
that of bad news is  . In this game traders arrive according to Poisson processes throughout the
day. Orders from informed traders arrive at rate  (on information event days), orders from
uninformed buyers arrive at rate  b . And orders from uninformed sellers arrive at rate  s . Traders
informed with bad news sell and those informed

with good news buy. That is, on a good news

day, the arrival rates are    b for buy orders and  s for sell orders. On bad news days, the
arrival rates are  b for buy orders and    s for sell orders. On no-news days, only uninformed
traders arrive, and the arrival rate of both buys and sells are  b and  s respectively. If an order
arrives at time t, the market maker observes the trade (either a buy or a sell), and he uses this
information to update his beliefs. New prices are set, trades evolve, and the price process moves
in response to the market maker’s changing beliefs. This process is captured in Figure 1 [as in
Easley et al. (2002).
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Once per
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Figure-1
Tree diagram of the trading process

This figure helps to parameterize the model as described in the original paper. Once the
model is parameterized it can be estimated using maximum likelihood method.
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Appendix-B
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for Portfolio One
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Earnings and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends)
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Q1

Q2

ASK

118

51.41

48.42

26.55

6.63

131.15

30.84

66.00

BID

118

46.95

43.83

24.63

6.05

112.07

28.22

60.40

Price

118

49.76

45.88

26.45

6.63

129.93

29.38

64.58

Share Outstanding

118

283,421

93,099

620,178

11,181

5,832,488

43,565

264,024

Market Capitalization

118

16,297,935

4,642,275

44,429,682

304,648

447,000,000

1,570,156

14,344,064

Volume

118

528,835

185,252

1,122,830

6,603

8,430,917

63,789

454,498

Forecasted DPS

118

0.33

0.25

0.54

-

5.00

0.10

0.40

Forecasted EPS

118

1.00

0.76

2.16

(7.00)

18.10

0.34

1.33

Surprise in EPS

118

0.76

5.10

19.00

(99.98)

47.44

(5.70)

7.51

Surprise in DPS

118

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Absolute Surprise in EPS

118

11.81

6.91

14.87

4.05

99.98

5.40

10.81

Absolute Surprise in DPS

118

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Quoted spread

118

4.45

3.28

3.79

0.58

23.16

2.02

5.61

Effective spread

118

3.20

1.78

3.79

0.05

21.33

0.77

4.30

Relative spread

118

0.10

0.08

0.07

0.02

0.45

0.05

0.11

This table shows the summary statistics for portfolio one which includes firms with highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute
surprises in dividends. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings
announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. Ask is the ask
price, Bid is the bid price, Market Capitalization is the product of market price and total number of share outstanding, Volume is the number of
shares traded, Forecasted DPS is the analyst forecast of dividend per share, Forecasted EPS is the analyst forecast of earnings per share, Surprise in
EPS is the difference between actual and forecasted earnings per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error, Surprise in DPS is the
difference between actual and forecasted dividend per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error. Absolute surprises in EPS and DPS
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are the absolute difference in earnings and dividend per share. Quoted spread is defined as (Ask – Bid), Effective spread is defined as 2|Transaction
price-Midpoint of bid and ask| and Relative spread is defined as (Ask - Bid)/((Ask + Bid)/2). Mean, Median and standard deviation is the average,
median and the standard deviation for respective parameters. Q1 and Q2 are first quartile and second quartile respectively.
.
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TABLE 2: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio One
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Earnings and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends)

Absolute Surprises
Positive Surprises in
Earnings
Negative Surprises in
Earnings

N

Differences in
Alpha

Differences in
Delta

Differences in
Epsilon

Differences in
Mu

118

0.0196

-0.0114

-282.9

-137.0

75

0.00430

-0.0154

-331.6

-137.5

43

0.0463

-0.00443

-331.6

-136.1

Differences in
PIN
0.00534
(1.87)
0.00443
(1.32)
0.00692
(1.31)

This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio one (118 observations) which constructed by
sorting firms with highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in dividends. The
sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and
earnings announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP,
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated
by maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of
PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected
dividends and earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN
parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents
arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. Parenthesis includes tstatistics.
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TABLE 3: Summary Statistics for Portfolio Two
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

Q1

Q2

ASK

107

45.94

44.65

22.21

6.04

127.91

29.66

59.64

BID

107

41.38

40.46

18.58

4.84

102.35

27.67

54.45

Price

107

43.10

41.36

19.24

5.91

110.92

28.08

56.61

Share Outstanding

107

480,595

160,200

898,141

13,266

6,468,000

63,743

404,644

Market Capitalization

107

19,085,673

7,729,650

30,875,646

307,241

176,000,000

2,410,896

18,261,173

Volume

107

571,161

227,359

1,700,151

4,346

17,171,814

91,023

461,784

Forecasted EPS

107

0.54

0.42

0.36

(0.90)

1.64

0.32

0.77

Forecasted DPS

107

0.24

0.19

0.20

0

1.04

0.07

0.35

Surprise in EPS

107

0.06

0

0.23

(0.30)

0.30

0

0.30

Surprise in DPS

107

2.28

1.61

15.12

(74.64)

79.55

(2.41)

3.21

Absolute Surprise in EPS

107

0.19

0.30

0.14

0

0.30

0

0.30

Absolute Surprise in DPS

107

7.68

2.41

13.20

1.61

79.55

1.61

7.23

Quoted spread

107

4.56

2.67

9.91

0.61

88.74

1.92

3.97

Effective spread

107

3.42

1.74

9.93

0.00

88.74

0.94

2.69

Relative spread

107

0.10

0.07

0.12

0.02

1.06

0.05

0.10

This table shows the summary statistics for portfolio two which includes firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute
surprises in earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings announcements
are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. Ask is the ask price, Bid is the bid
price, Market Capitalization is the product of market price and total number of share outstanding, Volume is the number of shares traded,
Forecasted DPS is the analyst forecast of dividend per share, Forecasted EPS is the analyst forecast of earnings per share, Surprise in EPS is the
difference between actual and forecasted earnings per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error, Surprise in DPS is the difference
between actual and forecasted dividend per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error. Absolute surprises in EPS and DPS are the
absolute difference in earnings and dividend per share. Quoted spread is defined as (Ask – Bid), Effective spread is defined as 2|Transaction priceMidpoint of bid and ask| and Relative spread is defined as (Ask - Bid)/((Ask + Bid)/2). Mean, Median and standard deviation is the average,
median and the standard deviation for respective parameters. Q1 and Q2 are first quartile and second quartile respectively.
.
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TABLE 4: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Two
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Absolute
Surprises
Positive
Surprises in
Dividends
Negative
Surprises in
Dividends

N

Differences in
Alpha

Differences in
Delta

Differences in
Epsilon

Differences in
Mu

Differences in
PIN

107

0.0134

-0.0105

-52.90

-26.99

0.00656*
(2.58)

69

0.00120

-0.00948

-94.75

-47.32

0.00493
(1.85)

38

0.0356

-0.0123

23.08

9.92

0.00952
(1.79)

This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio two (107 observations) which constructed by sorting
firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The sample
period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings
announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP,
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN.
The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. Parenthesis includes t-statistics.
* denotes significance at 5% level.
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TABLE 5: Size wise Distribution of Firms in Portfolio Three (Panel A)
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Variables

Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

(N=26)

(N=27)

(N=26)

(N=27)

Absolute Surprises in DPS

10.63

17.19

15.78

17.77

Absolute Surprises in EPS

0.1331

0.0872

0.0612

0.0693

Firm Size(mm $)

448.58

1377.31

7003.96

57257.84

TABLE 5: Size wise Distribution of Firms in Portfolio Four (Panel B)
(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Variables

Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

(N=23)

(N=27)

(N=30)

(N=24)

Absolute Surprises in DPS

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Absolute Surprises in EPS

0.0839

0.0736

0.0505

0.0759

Firm Size(mm $)

364.87

1464.93

4186.26

30120.77

This table reports the absolute surprises in dividends and earnings announcements for a sample of
U.S. firms. The sample for this study focuses on quarterly dividends announcements between 2002 and
2005. The sample does not include firms that initiate or resume dividends. The surprises in dividends
and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and earnings respectively.
The actual and expected dividends and earnings are obtained from summary history files of I/B/E/S.
The firms in the sample are sorted into deciles based on absolute surprises in dividends and then again
sorted into quartiles based on absolute surprises in earnings. Portfolio three includes the firms with
highest absolute surprises in dividend and lowest absolute surprises in earnings [107 observations].
Portfolio four constitute firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and earnings [107
observations] In panel A, the firms in Portfolio three are further sorted into quartiles by firm size,
where firm size is estimated by market capitalization on the first day of the quarter obtained from
CRSP. In panel B, the firms in Portfolio four are sorted based on firm size. Parenthesis includes tstatistics.
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TABLE 6: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Three
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Alpha(α)

Delta(δ)

Mu(µ)

Epsilon(ε)

PIN

Pre- Announcements

0.4456

0.3631

335.41

719.08

0.1192

Post- Announcements

0.4428

0.3706

299.85

723.42

0.1086

Event Windows

0.0106*
(2.47)

Difference (Pre-Post)

This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio three (107 observations) which constructed by sorting
firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The sample
period used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP,
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The
surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. Parenthesis includes t-statistics.
* denotes significance at 5% level.
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TABLE 7: Size-wise Distribution of PIN Parameters for Portfolio Three
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)
Event Windows

Alpha(α)

Delta(δ)

Mu(µ)

Epsilon(ε)

PIN

Quartile One (Small Firms)
Pre- Announcements

0.3579

0.4277

127.15

124.57

0.1514

Post- Announcements

0.4060

0.3796

89.54

110.38

0.1520

Quartile Two
Pre- Announcements

0.4434

0.3371

223.06

298.04

0.1337

Post- Announcements

0.3930

0.4211

198.29

307.26

0.1110

Quartile Three
Pre- Announcements

0.5041

0.3582

370.13

793.94

0.1115

Post- Announcements

0.4643

0.3348

370.40

808.17

0.0967

Quartile Four (Large Firm)
Pre- Announcements

0.4745

0.3293

621.31

1,659.77

0.0801

Post- Announcements

0.5079

0.3467

541.17

1,667.87

0.0746

Quartile One - Quartile Four
Pre- Announcements

Post- Announcements

-0.1176

**

(-2.98)
-0.1100

**

(-2.99)

0.0979

-496.52**

-1540.88**

0.0712**

(1.45)

(-7.21)

(-13.24)

(6.44)

**

0.0291

-449.44

(0.47)

(-9.67)

-1563.93

**

(-14.17)

0.0767**
(10.22)

This table shows the size-wise distribution of estimated PIN for portfolio three (107 observations) which
constructed by sorting firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in
earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging
I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28
trading days relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is
estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail
estimation of PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and
expected dividends and earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The
PIN parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu
represents arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. The firm size is
estimated by computing the market capitalization for each firm in the beginning of the sample year.
Parenthesis includes t-statistics.
** denotes significance at 1% level.
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TABLE 8: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Four

(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Event Windows

Alpha(α)

Delta(δ)

Mu(µ)

Epsilon(ε)

PIN

Pre- Announcements

0.4294

0.3501

292.722

619.519

0.1182

Post- Announcements

0.4490

0.3469

272.282

561.528

0.1193
-0.0012
(-0.27)

Difference (Pre-Post)

This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio four (107 observations) which constructed by sorting
firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002
to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases.
The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days relative to the announcements days [-2
days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function.
The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are
estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and earnings respectively using the summary
forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta
estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of
uninformed traders. Parenthesis includes t-statistics.
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TABLE 9: Size-wise Distribution of PIN Parameters for Portfolio Four
(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings)

Event Windows

Alpha(α)

Delta(δ)

Mu(µ)

Epsilon(ε)

PIN

Quartile One (Small Firms)
Pre- Announcements

0.4275

0.4435

102.94

94.67

0.1829

Post- Announcements

0.4122

0.3949

104.15

103.76

0.1776

Quartile Two
Pre- Announcements

0.3836

0.3937

181.91

256.83

0.1157

Post- Announcements

0.4353

0.3965

174.79

259.74

0.1213

Quartile Three
Pre- Announcements

0.4598

0.3179

338.70

782.24

0.0987

Post- Announcements

0.4922

0.3252

308.05

625.12

0.1073

Quartile Four (Large Firm)
Pre- Announcements

0.4452

0.2517

541.78

1327.13

0.0832

Post- Announcements

0.4456

0.2721

498.38

1260.25

0.0763

Quartile One - Quartile Four
Pre- Announcements

Post- Announcements

**

-0.0247

0.2135

(-0.48)

(2.84)

-440.10**

-1211.71**

0.0978**

(-5.21)

(-6.79)

(5.37)

**

-0.0408

0.1490

-379.10

(-1.02)

(1.80)

(-4.90)

-1140.77
(-7.67)

**

0.1009**
(8.68)

This table shows the size-wise distribution of estimated PIN for portfolio four (107 observations) which
constructed by sorting firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and in earnings. The sample period
used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP,
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The
surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. The firm size is estimated by computing the market
capitalization for each firm in the beginning of the sample year. Parenthesis includes t-statistics.
** denotes significance at 1% level.
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